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I. INTRODUCTION For more than eighty years, the estates of wealthy decedents have been subject to federal estate taxation. At first glance, the estate tax may appear to play a relatively minor role in the federal tax system. Compared to the personal income, corporate, or payroll taxes, the estate tax applies to a very small group of taxpayers and raises little revenue. Nevertheless, in recent years it has become the focus of heated controversy and extravagant rhetoric. Opponents have mounted a sustained campaign to abolish the tax, which they invariably refer to as the "death tax," portraying it as wasteful, ineffective, and fundamentally unfair. The anti-tax campaign gathered momentum in the late 1990s and moved into high gear in 2001 when George W. Bush was inaugurated as president. In his first major The 2001 Act provides sizable income and estate tax cuts over a protracted phase-in period, culminating in 2010 with repeal of the estate tax and introduction of a modified carryover basis system for inherited property. These changes are not permanent, however. Under a special "sunset" provision, the tax cuts are scheduled to expire automatically at the end of 2010, and prior law will spring back into force for 2011 and subsequent years. 3 Thus, if Congress takes no further action, the estate tax will disappear in 2010 and then reappear one year later. This bizarre result reflects a political stalemate between two competing groups: root-and-branch abolitionists who insist on complete and permanent repeal, and defenders of the tax who are willing to consider reform but balk at outright repeal. In 2001 the abolitionists were able to declare victory of a sort, for they succeeded in putting estate tax repeal on the books, but in the intervening years they failed to make repeal permanent. It now seems increasingly likely that the estate tax will survive in some form, although the details still have to be worked out.
The outlines of a pragmatic compromise involving a larger exemption and lower rates have been apparent since 2001.4 Why, then, has it proved so difficult for the opposing factions to reach an agreement? The protracted controversy can be explained largely as an exercise in political brinkmanship and anti-tax ideology. The notion of estate tax repeal may have proyed effective in rallying political support for the Bush administration's ambitious tax-cutting agenda, Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 , Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001 . [Vol. 28:369
but from a tax policy perspective it is deeply flawed. As a practical matter, the political stalemate can be resolved only when abolitionists acknowledge that outright repeal is neither simple nor costless.
II. RHETORIC OF REPEAL
Estate tax repeal emerged as a mainstream political issue in the 1990s. At the beginning of the decade, outright repeal was still generally viewed as unattainable, even among business owners, farmers, and other groups traditionally opposed to the tax. 5 Nevertheless, by 1999, repeal had become a politically potent slogan and an integral part of the conservative anti-tax agenda, thanks to the efforts of activists who worked tirelessly and single-mindedly to 6 mobilize public opinion against the estate tax. Their aim was not to inform but to persuade, and their message was simple, clear, and powerful. They denounced the estate tax as fundamentally "wrong" and "unfair," portraying it as a penalty on hard work and saving as
• 7
well as a threat to ordinary families and small businesses. Endlessly repeated and amplified in think-tank papers, op-ed pieces, and radio talk shows, the abolitionists' message eventually became accepted as an indisputable article of faith in anti-tax circles and as conventional wisdom among large segments of the general public.'
The estate tax did not figure among the tax cut priorities listed in the Republican leadership 's 1994 71-91 (2003) . 7 In the words of one prominent political consultant, the estate tax is the "wrong tax," comes at the "wrong time," hurts the "wrong people" and helps the "wrong people." "The Death Tax is simply unfair. It tells every American that no matter how hard you work or how wisely you manage your affairs, in the end the federal government is going to step in and take it away. The estate tax... punishes hard work and savings, it fails to raise the kind of revenues that might conceivably justify some of the damage it causes. It has been destroying businesses and ruining lives for four generations .. " GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 6, at 81-82 (quoting Frank Luntz).
8 For an excellent discussion of the complex interplay between opinion polls and perceptions of popular opinion, see id. at 118-30 (noting that opinion polls are often designed to elicit a desired response and the results are then used "to rally the
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Opponents of the estate tax skillfully designed their message to shape the terms of the debate, and they succeeded in two important ways. First, they portrayed the estate tax as a heavy burden for ordinary families and offered repeal as a simple, attractive solution. Their account of the estate tax was essentially a caricature that lampooned the tax's shortcomings and exaggerated its burdens. As economic analysis, the argument was shallow and tendentious, but as political rhetoric, it worked effectively to reinforce popular misperceptions about the estate tax and fuel anti-tax sentiment. 9 The case against the tax was freely embellished with compelling personal stories that pitted plucky entrepreneurs and their families against heartless tax collectors. Although some of the stories were semifictionalized, factual accuracy was not important; the purpose of the stories was to put a human face on the anti-tax message and enhance its dramatic impact. 1° Indeed, the argument against the estate tax relied more on emotional persuasion than on reasoned analysis. The abolitionists were not interested in examining alternative theories or empirical evidence, nor were they concerned about the practical implications of repeal. Having set out to eliminate the estate tax, they tailored every facet of their message to point unequivocally toward repeal.
The second way in which the anti-tax message shaped the debate lay in its appeal to fairness and morality. The estate tax has long been viewed by its defenders as promoting equality of opportunity by curbing concentrations of inherited wealth. In a bold rhetorical move, the abolitionists seized the moral high ground and denounced the estate tax as fundamentally unfair. Equating wealth and success with traditional virtues of hard work, prudent saving, and self-reliance, they portrayed the estate tax as a penalty on virtue and an enemy of the "American dream." The abolitionists thus achieved the remarkable feat of articulating a populist rationale for an antiprogressive tax agenda. More importantly, they shifted the debate faithful, get media attention, and intimidate potential opposition").
9 Many Americans are "unrealistically optimistic" about their own economic circumstances, both in absolute terms and relative to others, and exaggerate their prospects of becoming rich. Id. at 119; see also id. at 96 ("[Plolls routinely show that some 20 percent of the American population believe that they are in the top 1 percent, and another 20 percent believe that they will soon reach that echelon." By the end of the 1990s the abolitionist message had gained political traction." Estate tax repeal figured as a prominent issue in the 2000 presidential campaign, especially after candidate George W. Bush endorsed repeal as part of his tax-cutting agenda, along with income tax rate cuts, an expanded child credit, and reduction of the marriage tax penalty. 12 With Bush's inauguration as president, the prospects of enacting estate tax repeal improved dramatically. Assimilation into the tax-cutting agenda came at a price, however, for the Bush administration exercised total control over the terms of its proposals and demanded unwavering support from its allies. To coordinate political support for its proposals, the administration assembled a formidable new coalition which enforced strict discipline and prevented business groups from pursuing their own separate tax proposals. 3 As estate tax repeal gained political momentum, it also became hostage to the administration's much larger and more ambitious tax-cutting agenda.
The Bush administration formulated its proposals against the backdrop of a large projected budget surplus, which briefly opened a window of opportunity to pay down the federal debt, pursue fundamental tax reform, or cut taxes. 14 The Bush administration opted for massive tax cuts. Although there was bipartisan support in Congress for some form of tax relief, the size of the administration's package proved controversial and it became clear that the proposed tax cuts would have to be scaled back in order to pass the budget resolution in the Senate. 5 The estate tax cuts came under especially intense pressure, for many legislators cared less about getting rid of the estate tax than about delivering broad-based income tax cuts. 16 To bring the ten-year revenue cost of the 2001 Act within the $1.35 trillion ceiling established in the budget resolution, lawmakers resorted to various gimmicks including phase-ins, phase-outs, and sunsets. 7 It had long been clear that estate tax repeal would have to be phased in over time; the cost of immediate repeal would have been prohibitively high. To minimize the cost of the estate tax cuts during the ten-year budget window, the 2001 Act called for gradual cuts in the top marginal rate and periodic increases in the estate tax exemption, followed by full repeal and the introduction of carryover basis in 2010." In a last-minute scramble for revenue, the conference 14 In January 2001 the Congressional Budget Office projected a ten-year budget surplus of $5.6 trillion (including an off-budget surplus of nearly $2.5 trillion primarily attributable to Social Security). See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2002 -2011 , at xiv (2001 . By January 2002, the projected surplus had dwindled to $1.6 trillion. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2003 -2012 , at xiii (2002 . 15 The budget resolution invoked a reconciliation process which ensured that the REV. 187, 193-94 (2002) . The revenue losses from the estate tax cuts were heavily weighted toward the far end of the ten-year budget window. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT FOR H.R. 1836, at 3 (Joint committee added two further gimmicks, accelerating the phase-out of the state death tax credit and preserving the gift tax as a stand-alone tax. 9 The ten-year revenue cost of the estate tax cuts under the conference agreement was less than half the estimated cost under the Bush administration's proposals.20
The long-term revenue cost of estate tax repeal presented a more intractable problem. Under the 2001 Act, only one year of repeal was included within the ten-year budget window, but if repeal were made permanent, the true cost would rapidly escalate for years outside the budget window. Although tax cuts could be enacted by a simple majority vote in both houses of Congress, the so-called Byrd rule made it virtually impossible to make the tax cuts permanent without a sixty-vote supermajority in the Senate. 21 Under the sunset provision agreed to in conference, all of the tax cuts would automatically expire at the end of 2010, thereby avoiding the prospect of a Byrd rule challenge and ensuring that the tax cuts could be enacted with a 22 simple majority in the Senate. In effect, the sunset provision limited the scheduled repeal of the estate tax to a single year following a protracted phase-out period, and left the issue of permanent repeal unresolved.
The Bush administration and its allies in Congress almost certainly could have marshaled the necessary votes to enact permanent estate tax cuts in 2001, had they been willing to settle for a compromise package that provided a higher exemption and lower rates." Instead, they insisted on complete estate tax repeal, no matter how long delayed, confident that once repeal was on the books they would be able to make it permanent. In hindsight this appears to have been a risky gamble, but at the time it may have seemed like a reasonable strategy. From the outset, the abolitionists viewed estate tax repeal as a nonnegotiable matter of principle, and in framing their message they appealed to abstract values of fairness, optimism, and self-reliance. It was this intransigent stance of moral commitment that energized the campaign for repeal and at the same time made it 21 difficult to reach a pragmatic compromise. Similarly, the simple slogan of estate tax repeal provided a rallying point for members of the administration's coalition of anti-tax groups. Many business owners and farmers in the coalition might have preferred immediate relief in the form of a higher exemption and lower rates, especially compared to the bizarrely convoluted and evanescent version of repeal that was ultimately enacted.
2 ' But there is no indication that they had any choice in the matter. Indeed, any discussion of alternatives to complete repeal might have splintered the coalition and derailed the political momentum behind the administration's tax Permanent?, 102 TAX NOTES 1277 , 1279 (Mar. 8, 2004 ) (noting that, within the reconciliation process, the Bush administration could have sought "a smaller tax cut within the ten-year budget window in exchange for making the tax cut permanent" but refused to do so).
24 See GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 6, at 261 ("The same moral commitments that held the group together made it difficult to compromise.").
25 For a significant number of taxpayers at the lower end of the spectrum of taxable estates, an immediate increase in the exemption, together with an unlimited deathtime basis step-up, would have been objectively preferable to the remote possibility of repeal coupled with carryover basis. For a few extremely wealthy families, however, neither an increased exemption nor lower rates would provide significant benefits compared to complete repeal. For them, maintaining a unified coalition and pressing for complete repeal may have been a rational strategy. See id. at 191, 214-17, 258-59.
Cuts.
2 6 In short, for committed abolitionists, anything short of complete repeal would have spelled moral weakness and political defeat.
If the abolitionists expected to follow up on the 2001 Act with a decisive vote for permanent estate tax repeal, the gamble has not paid off. Despite repeated attempts since 2001 to make repeal permanent, they have failed to muster the necessary sixty votes in the Senate. At the same time, no working majority has coalesced around any realistic reform proposal. As a result, the 2001 Act has ushered in a period of instability and uncertainty concerning the future of the estate tax. This situation offers lawmakers a golden opportunity to solicit contributions from lobbyists and wealthy constituents seeking to make estate tax repeal permanent.2 8 Indeed, Professors Edward McCaffery and Linda Cohen see this "shakedown" dynamic as the key to the political standoff over estate tax repeal . 9 They argue that opponents of the tax could have mobilized at least sixty votes for permanent repeal in the Senate in 200130 but deliberately chose not to do so in 26 See id. at 191 (noting that "decision-making in the coalition had become a top down affair"), 217 (noting that in the run-up to enactment of the 2001 Act "the only way to sustain the momentum for the tax bill was to put on blinders, ask few questions, and push for repeal"). the end of an extended phase-in period, the repealers ensure that they can take advantage of continuing uncertainty and instability to extract contributions from wealthy political donors."); cf. Johnston, supra note 6, at 78 (noting that delayed repeal affords "years of opportunities to raise money from donors who could see the abyss coming and would be eager to speed up the effective date of repeal" . 875, 882, 888-89 (1975) (noting that legislation is much more valuable if all its benefits flow without future legislative action, and that "the legislature has powerful incentives to devise methods of increasing the permanency of legislation"). An equally plausible explanation is that opponents of the estate tax realized they could not muster the requisite sixty votes in the Senate and accordingly made the best of the situation by continuing to press for permanent repeal while extracting annual contributions from lobbyists and interest groups. 
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The Empty Promise of Estate Tax Repeal budget window was constrained directly by the amount set forth in the budget resolution and indirectly by the Senate "paygo" rules in effect in 2001." 5 The extended phase-in of estate tax cuts flowed directly from the decision to squeeze $1.64 trillion of tax cuts into a $1.35 trillion container, coupled with the relatively low priority of estate tax repeal compared to broad-based income tax cuts. 36 More importantly, the Byrd rule effectively prevented the tax cuts from being made permanent; any extension beyond the ten-year budget window would have required sixty votes in the Senate. 37 The Byrd rule was designed to make it difficult to use the fast-track reconciliation process to enact 38 legislation that would increase long-term budget deficits, and it altered the budget rules but "chose instead to hide behind the rules, prolonging the game"). political ambition, and self-interest. To the extent they considered competing policy goals, the administration's supporters presumably placed more emphasis on economic stimulus and capital formation while opponents were more concerned with distributional equity and long-term revenue costs. While abolitionists naturally aligned view in the Senate was that deficit reduction was so important that it warranted fasttrack consideration. However, Senators wanted to make sure that this privileged procedure was applied only to measures which would decrease the deficit."). (2004) (noting that the long-run budget effect is similar to a permanent tax cut but introduces "considerable uncertainty" into the tax system). Although a series of annual extensions would circumvent the Byrd rule, it would also force lawmakers to weigh estate tax repeal against other (possibly more pressing) expiring tax cuts. See id. at 552 (noting that reestablishing paygo rules might have "perverse effect" of giving proponents of tax cuts for the rich leverage to demand extension of those cuts in conjunction with extension of middle-class tax cuts). 39 During most of the 1990s the budget rules worked effectively to enforce a political consensus on the importance of deficit reduction. However, with the unexpected emergence of surpluses beginning in 1998, the underlying consensus disintegrated and budget discipline eroded. From this perspective, the gimmicks in the 2001 Act and subsequent tax cuts may foreshadow a much larger fiscal crisis. See Penner & Steuerle, supra note 38, at 547-53; id. at 556 ("It is extremely difficult to design rules that prevent the Congress from imposing costs on future generations.").
[Vol. (describing the use of sunset provision to avoid the appearance of long-term deficits, followed by change in baseline to avoid impact of sunset provision, as "bait-and-switch" tactic). 43 See I.R.C. § 1014(a) (providing basis generally equal to fair market value of property acquired from decedent). As a proxy for a deathtime gains tax, the estate tax is both overinclusive (because it reaches fair market value, regardless of unrealized appreciation, and often applies at higher marginal rates) and underinclusive (because it fails to reach substantial amounts of property due to a large exemption and unlimited marital deduction). By some estimates up to one-half of all capital gains permanently escape income taxation due to the deathtime basis step-up. TAX REV. 499, 554 (2001) (discussing carryover basis and concluding that in the absence of an estate tax a deathtime gains tax "may be preferable [to carryover basis] in terms of distributional impact and revenue-raising capacity as well as effectiveness in curbing deferral and ameliorating lock-in"); Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing Gains at be preferable to carryover basis as a matter of policy, but it has consistently failed to gain political traction, perhaps because if exemptions were set low enough to raise substantial revenue much of the burden of the tax would be shifted to middle-income taxpayers who are currently not subject to the estate tax. 46 Instead, Congress chose in 2001 to couple estate tax repeal with a modified form of carryover basis for property passing from a decedent. The central problems with carryover basis stem from its feeble revenue-raising capacity and its regressive distributional effects. 47 Carryover basis inherently allows taxpayers who inherit appreciated property to defer paying tax on the unrealized gain until they sell the property. In this context, deferral is equivalent to a reduction in the rate of tax on capital gains; the longer the deferral period, the lower the effective tax rate. 48 The benefits of deferral are greatest at the top of the wealth distribution, because the ratio of unrealized gain to asset value tends to rise with net worth. 49 In any event, the new carryover basis
Death, 46 VAND. L. REV. 361, 441 (1993) (concluding that "it is possible to design a death gains tax that is workable, fair, and raises substantial revenue" and that "taxing gains at death is a more attractive option than carryover basis"). Budget Office estimated that a generic carryover basis system would raise total revenue of $52.5 billion during the period 2002-2011, slightly more than half the yield of a deathtime gains tax. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 46, at 422 (assuming basis equal to 50 percent of deathtime value). Revenue estimates for any carryover basis system are sensitive to the time horizon for realization of gains, which in turn is extremely difficult to predict. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PERSPECTIVES ON THE OWNERSHIP OF CAPITAL ASSETS AND THE REALIZATION OF CAPITAL GAINS 10-11 (1997) (noting that effective tax rate, assuming 7 percent annual appreciation, would be "about one-half the statutory rate of 28 percent if the asset was held for 30 years"). 49 According to one study, unrealized capital gains represent 36 percent of the total expected value of all estates and 56 percent of the total expected value of estates of $10 million or more. See Poterba & Weisbenner, supra note 46, at 439, 440 tbl.10-8. The composition of estate assets and sources of unrealized appreciation vary provisions will apply only to a small number of very large estates; the 2001 Act provides generous exemptions which ensure that the vast bulk of appreciated property passing at death will continue to receive a tax-free basis step-up. 0 Ironically, it is precisely taxpayers at the top of the wealth distribution who may be able to defer realizing gains indefinitely and reduce the effective tax rate to a negligible level. For families that pass dynastic wealth intact from generation to generation, carryover basis poses no serious threat. The carryover basis system in the 2001 Act also raises concerns about compliance and administration. Even in the absence of the estate tax, executors will be required to collect and report detailed information including adjusted basis and fair market value for property owned at death in order to make a valid allocation of any allowable basis increase. 51 In addition, the statute gives executors broad discretion to allocate the basis increase among estate assets but fails to specify a default method of allocation. Executors may find their fiduciary responsibilities under the new carryover basis system to be at least as costly and burdensome as under the estate tax." Moreover, because the statute provides no formal procedure for reviewing the basis information reported by executors, there is no assurance that beneficiaries can rely on such information in reporting gain or loss on an eventual sale of property acquired from a decedent. The lack of a mechanism for making a final and binding determination significantly within and across different wealth and income categories. See id. at 439, 442.
5o The exemptions allow a basis increase for up to $1,300,000 of unrealized appreciation in any property owned at death, as well as up to $3,000,000 of unrealized appreciation in property passing in qualifying form to the decedent's surviving spouse. 54 As a measure to deter income shifting, a standalone gift tax seems cumbersome and ineffective. It perpetuates much of the complexity of current law with weakened enforcement mechanisms, and creates a perverse incentive for individuals to hold appreciated property until death in order to take advantage of the exemptions from carryover basis and obtain a limited basis step-up. In the absence of the estate tax, it is difficult to see how a stand-alone gift tax -or, for that matter, carryover basis -can last very long. Indeed, both measures may be seen as subterfuges designed to mask the costs of abolishing the estate tax.
Given the political deadlock between abolitionists and defenders of the estate tax, it is tempting to consider alternative approaches to taxing inherited wealth. The anti-tax message draws much of its rhetorical force from images of severe hardships imposed by the estate tax on virtuous, hard-working entrepreneurs; understandably, abolitionists do not dwell on countervailing images of large inherited fortunes squandered by undeserving beneficiaries. Arguably, the antitax message would lose some of its appeal if the debate focused on the implications of inherited wealth from the perspective of beneficiaries rather than transferors. 55 Moreover, such a shift might come about more readily if the transferor-centered estate tax were reconfigured as a beneficiary-centered tax on inherited wealth.
One leading proposal along these lines is an accessions tax which would be imposed at progressive rates on cumulative gifts and bequests received by each individual beneficiary during his or her lifetime. 56 The main advantages of the accessions tax are that it " See id. at 216-20. automatically aligns the burden of the tax with the benefit of the transfer and unifies the tax treatment of gifts and bequests. As a result, the accessions tax may be perceived as fairer than the estate tax in the sense that beneficiaries who receive equal amounts of gifts and bequests are taxed equally, without regard to the number of transferors, the size of any transferor's estate, or amounts transferred to others. In addition, by taxing accessions at the time of receipt, the tax avoids some difficult valuation problems concerning transfers in trust. 57 Nevertheless, although the accessions tax proposal has sparked considerable interest in academic circles, it has never attracted political support as a legislative proposal. Alternatively, the taxation of inherited wealth could be integrated with the income tax by including gifts and bequests in the beneficiary's gross income. 58 The attraction of the income tax approach stems from its apparent simplicity and its implicit acknowledgment that gifts and bequests reflect ability to pay to the same extent as realized accessions to wealth from any other source. 59 On closer examination, however, this approach may not be so simple after all. Conceptually, it seems clear that a beneficiary who includes a gift or bequest of appreciated 57 To prevent indefinite deferral of tax through the use of long-term trusts, it may be appropriate to collect a withholding tax at the creation of a trust, which could then be credited against the tax ultimately imposed on distributions to individual beneficiaries. See Andrews, supra note 56, at 605-13. A separate and more intractable problem arises from the widespread use of family limited partnerships and similar entities to obtain valuation discounts for lack of marketability and lack of control. (Brookings Inst., Hamilton Project, 2007 ). Batchelder's proposal would tax gifts and bequests as income to the recipient at a special rate equal to the recipient's regular marginal rate plus 15 percent, subject to a cumulative lifetime exemption of $2,300,000 (indexed for inflation) as well as smaller annual exclusions. To avoid hardship in certain cases involving illiquid assets, the tax could be deferred (with interest) until the assets were sold. Trusts with multiple taxable beneficiaries would be subject to a special withholding tax that would eventually be credited (with interest) against the tax owed by the beneficiary upon distribution. The proposal would also replace the deathtime basis step-up of current law with carryover basis. Furthermore, in the absence of an estate tax, it would be difficult to justify failing to tax the transferor on any unrealized appreciation at the time of the transfer.
6
' The net result -taxing the transferor on unrealized appreciation and simultaneously taxing the beneficiary on the full value of the transferred property -would almost certainly provoke charges of unfair "double taxation," while the obvious methods of relief -substituting carryover basis for the transferorlevel tax or allowing deferral of the beneficiary-level tax -would erode the effective rate of tax and impair the administrability of the 61 income tax approach. In addition, an income tax approach that fails to impose some type of generation-skipping tax or differential rate structure would encourage very wealthy families to establish longterm dynasty trusts. 63 60 This would require a change in the treatment of property acquired by gift under current law. See I.R.C. § 1015. Batchelder's proposal would move in the opposite direction and require the beneficiary to take a carryover basis in property acquired by gift or bequest. See Batchelder, supra note 59, at 20 (rejecting deemed realization because it "might undercut political support for taxing inherited income"); id. at 45 (asserting, without explanation, that "experience suggests that carryover basis for bequests would be workable"). In this context, carryover basis appears conceptually awkward and also raises significant practical problems of implementation. See id. at 21 (suggesting basis step-up for appreciated assets worth less than $10,000 and not held for production of income).
61 See Burke & McCouch, supra note 45, at 551-52 ("[I]ncluding gifts and bequests in the recipient's income tax base implies not only that the recipient would receive the transferred property with a fair-market-value basis (reflecting the amount included in income) but also that the transferor would realize any built-in gain at the time of the transfer."). 62 Batchelder's proposal would allow a beneficiary to defer the tax on inherited illiquid assets (e.g., a closely held business or farm) to the extent the tax could not be paid with other inherited liquid assets. See Batchelder, supra note 59, at 21-23. Moreover, "if the heir held on to an illiquid asset for life and ultimately bequeathed it to someone else, the associated tax would carry over to the new heir." Id. at 23. In this situation, deferral would amount to a reduction in the effective rate of tax, notwithstanding the accruing interest charge, because all subsequent transfers from one beneficiary to the next during the deferral period would escape tax entirely. The only tax that would ever be paid (when the asset was eventually sold) would be the tax on the transfer to the initial beneficiary (plus interest). 63 Cf. Andrews, supra note 55, at 466-67 ("Transfers are the convenient occasion for imposing tax, but the underlying object is transmission of wealth, and a transfer [from] a grandparent to a grandchild involves twice as much transmission as does a transfer from parent to child.... Wealth transferred from grandparent to grandchild is surplus in relation to two generations, not just one.").
Perhaps, after all, incremental adjustments to the existing estate tax represent the most realistic prospect for reform. In the current political climate, it is difficult to imagine opponents of the estate tax embracing any alternative system of taxing inherited wealth, even (or perhaps especially) one that might be widely perceived as fairer and more effective than the estate tax. 64 Looking ahead, the central task will be to mitigate the damage done in 2001 and establish a reunified estate and gift tax system with an indexed exemption of reasonable 65 size and a moderately graduated rate structure.
V. CONCLUSION The terms of the debate over the estate tax have been framed largely by abolitionists who have relentlessly propounded a powerful anti-tax message that portrays the estate tax as unambiguously harmful and threatening to ordinary families and small businesses. The attack on the estate tax is inextricably linked to a larger agenda of eliminating taxes on capital and capital income and dismantling the progressive elements of the federal tax system. 66 The slogan of estate tax repeal, while remarkably effective in mobilizing anti-tax sentiment, makes no sense as a matter of tax policy because it Estate tax repeal is not inherently inconsistent with the goal of making the tax system simpler and fairer. See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE L.J. 283, 345, 352 (1994) (advocating "progressive consumption-without-estate tax" with separate, higher rates on consumption from inherited wealth); Edward J. McCaffery, A New Understanding of Tax, 103 MICH. L. REV. 807, 812 (2005) (advocating "progressive postpaid consumption tax" as "the fairest and least arbitrary of all comprehensive tax systems").-Most advocates of estate tax repeal, however, show no interest in maintaining any significant degree of progressivity in the overall tax system. 65 Any proposal to set the top marginal estate tax rate equal to the prevailing income tax rate for capital gains while retaining large exemptions would be equivalent for the vast majority of taxpayers to outright repeal of the estate tax. For the very rich, the effect would be equivalent to a deathtime gains tax with a reduced effective rate. By one estimate, the total revenue cost for fiscal years 2008-2012 of extending the estate tax cuts in the 2001 Act would be $102.4 billion, while the cost of restoring the estate tax in 2010 with a $5 million exemption (indexed for inflation) and a flat rate equal to the top capital gains rate would be $74.8 billion, and the cost of restoring the estate tax with a $3.5 million exemption (indexed for inflation) and a flat 45 percent rate would be $30 billion. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, BUDGET OPTIONS 313-15 (2007) . 66 See GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 6, at 4 ("Estate tax repeal is one important strand of a looming effort to strip from our nation's tax system the very idea that those who have more should shoulder a larger share of the tax burden."); id. at 266-78 (linking estate tax repeal to broader antitax agenda).
downplays revenue costs, distributional effects, administrative concerns, and consequences for the rest of the tax system. The 2001 Act illustrates the gap between the abolitionists' simplistic anti-tax agenda and the complex reality of tradeoffs among competing tax and spending priorities. The estate tax cuts enacted in 2001 imply large revenue losses as well as a shift in tax burdens from the very rich to the middle class and from current taxpayers to future taxpayers. This appears to be a step in precisely the wrong direction, given growing inequalities of income and wealth and a looming fiscal gap. As a practical matter, it seems increasingly unlikely that the estate tax will be permanently repealed. The protracted phase-out period and the sunset provision in the 2001 Act have exacerbated uncertainty and destabilized the tax system while encouraging strategic behavior by lawmakers and interest groups. In the ensuing game of brinkmanship, if the abolitionists fail to make repeal permanent, they will undoubtedly attempt to characterize the restoration of the estate tax as a tax increase. Nevertheless, if Congress is finally forced to confront the real implications of estate tax repeal and roll back some of the Bush administration's tax cuts, the abolitionists may find that their reach exceeds their grasp.
